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CHAPTER 5 
Insurance Law 
EDWARD N. WADSWORTH 
A. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
§5.1. Motor vehicle liability insurance: The effect of no-fault con-
cepts on the rate setting process. Controversies stemming from the 
enactment of personal injury no-fault motor vehicle liability insurance 
in Massachusetts continued to confront the Supreme Judicial Court 
during the 1972 Survey year. Employers' Commercial Union Ins. Co. 
v. Commissioner of Ins.,l which involved a constitutional attack on 
changes in the premium rate setting process, represents a break in a 
long string of victories for the insurance industry in auto rate cases. 
In October of 1970 the Commissioner of Insurance established com-
pulsory automobile insurance premium rates for 1971. However, be-
cause of the anticipated but undeterminable effect which no-fault 
concepts2 would have on the claim experience of insurers, and because 
of the possibility of successful constitutional attack on all or part of 
the no-fault law, it was impossible to definitively establish "adequate, 
just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory"3 rates at that time. Accordingly, 
the Commissioner and the insurers agreed that a premium endorse-
ment should be attached to all 1971 policies which provided, inter alia, 
that "premiums ... shall be deemed provisional and subject to re-
computation."4 
Recognizing the need of introducing additional flexibility into the 
rate setting process, the 1971 legislature enacted Chapter 977 of the 
EDWARD N. WADSWORTH is an associate counsel for New England Mutual Life 
Insurance Company, Boston. 
§5.1. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1105, 283 N.E.2d 849. 
2 Introduced by Acts of 1970, c. 670, as amended by Acts of 1970, c. 744. 
This Act became effective on January 1, 1971. Acts of 1970, c. 670 §l0. 
3 G.L., c. 175, §1l3B. . 
4 The premium endorsement read as follows: "It is agreed that: In the event 
of any change in .the . . • premiums • . . applicable to the insurance afforded, 
because of a ruling of the Commissioner . . . or on adverse judicial finding as 
to the constitutionality of any provisions of Chapter 670 of the Acts of 1970 
... , the premium stated in the declarations ... shall be deemed provisional and 
subject to recomputation. If the final premium thus recomputed exceeds the pre-
mium stated •.. the named insured shall pay the excess to the company; if less, 
the company shall return to the named insured the excess of such final premium." 
1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1105, 1109-1110, 283 N.E.2d 849, 853. 
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Acts of 1971, which added a new paragraph to G.L., c. 1975, §113B. 
This paragraph requires the Commissioner, when establishing rates 
for any ensuing year, to first detennine whether rates for the current 
year are "adequate, just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory." If they 
are not, the Commissioner is directed to take this into consideration 
and to set rates for the ensuing year at levels that will result in com-
pliance with the statutory standard for the two years taken together.5 
Other provisions of Chapter 977, aimed more specifically at 1971 
and 1972 premiums, directed the Commissioner to hold a hearing in 
November of 1971 to determine whether insurers would make an "unfair 
profit" from compulsory insurance premiums in 1971 and, if so, to direct 
them to establish a special reserve from which policyholders might 
share in any excess profits. If the Commissioner could not detennine 
the amount of such "unfair profit" by December 1 (as was the case), 
he was directed to set provisional 1972 rates. At a subsequent hearing 
to be held in 1972, after information relating to the 1971 profits of 
insurers became available, the Commissioner was then to detennine 
whether the provisional 1972 rates met the statutory standards, using 
the two-year averaging concept. If those standards were not met, the 
Commissioner was directed either to adjust and finalize the 1972 rates 
so that they were, or to direct the insurers to return any unfair profits 
to the 1971 policy-holders.6 
As required by Chapter 977, the Commissioner set provisional 1972 
rates in December of 1971 and ordered the insurance companies to 
establish a special reserve of 35% of the premiums received on com-
pulsory insurance in 1971. The plaintiffs, representing various segments 
of the casualty insurance industry, then filed an action to challenge the 
constitutionality of Chapter 977. They argued that any order to refund 
excessive profits would be an unconstitutional taking of property and 
an unconstitutional impairment of contract, since the premiums' had 
become the property of the insurance companies. Distinguishing an 
earlier and somewhat analogous case/ the Court rejected these argu-
ments on the basis that the premium endorsement attached to all 1971 
policies clearly rendered the premiums provisional and subject to change 
by ruling of the Commissioner. Therefore, the 1971 premiums were not 
the property of the insurance companies.8 
The plaintiffs also argued that Chapter 977 was unconstitutional in 
that it allowed the Commissioner to issue an order that could be 
inequitable and discriminatory. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that 
the Commissioner was given leave simply to reduce the provisional 
1972 rates without ordering a refund of the excess profits from 1971 to 
5 Acts of 1971, c. 977, UA. 
6 Id., §2. 
7 Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 711, 134 N.E.2d 923 (1956). In that 
opinion, the Court held unconstitutional proposed legislation that would have re-
quired the refunding of part of the 1956 compulsory premium charges. 
8 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1105, 1109, 283 N.E.2d 849, 853. 
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1971 policyholders. A person who held a policy in 1971 but not in 
1972 would then be denied a rebate of his excessive 1971 premium 
payments while a new 1972 policyholder would receive a windfall 
rebate. The Court rejected this argument: 
The adjustment of 1972 rates for excessive profits for 1971 ... is 
no different from using experience of previous years to determine 
the rates to be set for the future. Statute 1971, c. 977, merely 
requires the Commissioner . . . to add to his normal use of prior 
experience the procedure of looking at both years together for the 
purpose of setting fair current rates.9 
The Court also cited the savings in time and expense to be realized 
by adjusting the 1972 rates instead of making rebates to individual 
1971 policyholders. 
While one may disagree with the Court's statement that the re-
duction of present rates contemplated by Chapter 977 is "no different" 
from using previous years' experience in the rate setting process, the 
basic concept of compensating for one year's inappropriate rates in the 
next year's rates seems generally reasonable. However, as the discrepancy 
in the earlier year's rates to be made up in the ensuing year's rates be-
comes larger, the "unfairness" of this technique becomes more pro-
nounced. At some point this "unfairness" might rise to a constitutional 
issue. 
It may be noted that Employers' Commercial Union created a potential 
dilemma for the insurance companies involved. The premium endorse-
ment attached to 1971 policies specified that "the company shall return 
to the named insured" any premium rebate. This would seemingly 
give 1971 policyholders contractual rights to demand that premium 
excesses be returned to them. The Commissioner's exercise of his option 
to reduce provisional 1972 rates in lieu of returning excesses to 1971 
policyholders might impair this constitutionally protected contract right. 
Fortunately, this problem never materialized since the insurance com-
panies, pursuant to the Commissioner's "Findings and Order" dated 
October 11, 1972, promptly made rebates to all 1971 policyholders. 
§5.2. Commissioner's power to regulate casualty insurance rates. 
Premium rates charged by Massachusetts insurers for certain types of 
casualty insurance are established by reference to the provisions of 
Chapter 175A of the General Laws.1 Under this statutory scheme, rates 
may be determined by the insurers but must be filed with the Commis-
sioner of Insurance. Rates so filed become effective unless disapproved 
by the Commissioner.2 In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Commissioner 01 
9 Id. at 1111-1112, 283 N.E.2d at 854. 
§5.2. 1 Chapter 175A is not applicable to the rates charged for certain speci-
fied types of insurance. G.L., c. 175A, §4, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 896, 
§2. For example, the rates considered in § 1, supra, are regulated under G.L., c. 
175, §113B, and not under Chapter 175A. 
2 Disapproval of filed rates is governed by G.L., c. 175A, §7(a}. For an over-
3
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Ins.,S Travelers made a filing on its own behalf substantially increasing 
its noncompulsory "Private Passenger Automobile Physical Damage 
Rates." A hearing was held to produce additional information which 
would allow the Commissioner and his chief actuary to properly analyze 
and evaluate the filing. Two days after the hearing, the Commissioner 
filed a written opinion disapproving the filing, stating simply that it 
"does not meet the requirements of M.G.L. c. 175." Travelers appealed 
this decision to the Supreme Judicial Court,4 arguing that the proposed 
rates were not "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory" within 
the meaning of G.L., c. 175A, §5(a) (4). Travelers assumed that the 
only permissible basis for disapproval could be the failure to meet these 
criteria. However, the Court indicated that other permissible grounds 
for disapproval also exist. Alluding to the "fundamental requirement" 
that sufficient supporting information be made available to allow the 
Commissioner to reasonably evaluate the rate filing,5 the Court held 
that the Commissioner could disapprove a rate filing if the supporting 
information was not sufficient to allow him to measure the filed rates 
against the statutory criteria.6 
However, the Commissioner's brief opinion disapproving Traveler's 
rate filing failed to specify "in what respect . . . such filing fails to 
meet the requirements of this chapter.'" Since the statute so requires, 
the case was remanded to the Commissioner with instructions to modify 
his earlier opinion to comply with the statutory requirements.s 
§5.3. Judicial review of the 1972 motor vehicle, increased limits 
insurance rates. Insurance companies which write compulsory motor , ... , 
vehicle bodily injury liability insurance are required to offer to their .' 
Massachusetts policyholders certain additional personal injury and 
death coverages characterized as increased limits insurance. 1 The rates 
for such coverages are set by the Commissioner of Insurance pursuant 
to G.L., c. 175 §113B. In December of 1971 the Commissioner set the 
1972 rates for increased limits insurance at levels that continued in 
effect the 15% reduction which had been required for all motor vehicle 
insurance coverage by the 1970 no-fault law.2 This decision was con-
trary to the recommendations of both the chief actuary and the Massa-
chusetts Automobile Rating and Accident Prevention Bureau. It also 
view of the rate-setting process under Chapter 175A, see 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §11.20. 
3 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1415, 285 N.E.2d 442. 
4 Such appeal may be brought under G.L., c. 175A, §19(c). 
5 Mass. Medical Service v. Commissioner of Ins., 346 Mass. 346, 191 N.E.2d 
777 (1963). 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1415, 1417-1418, 285 N.E.2d 442, 444-445. 
7 G.L., c. 175A, §7(a). 
8 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1415, 1419, 285 N.E.2d 442, 445. 
15.3. 1 G.L., 175, Ill3C. 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 670, 16. 
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ignored the Supreme Judicial Court's prior declaration that a similar 
15 percent reduction in property damage liability rates was unconstitu-
tional because insurers "have a right to rates which are not confisca-
tory."3 The bureau, joined by 22 insurance companies, appealed the 
Commissioner's decision in Mass. Auto. Rating and Accident Prevention 
Bureau, v. Commissioner of Ins.,4 arguing that the rates thus set were 
not "adequate, just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory."5 
Since the 1972 rates attacked in this case merely continued a rate re-
duction made for 1971, plaintiffs in effect were challenging that previous 
reduction. The insurance companies had not challenged 1971 increased 
limits premium rates because they were pre-occupied with more im-
portant challenges to the controversial no-fault statute. The Commis-
sioner argued that the failure to object to the 1971 rates amounted to 
an "acceptance" of such rates, and that this acceptance created an in-
ference that the rates were not confiscatory. 
With virtually no discussion, the Court rejected these arguments and 
held that the Commissioner had erred in setting the 1972 rates.6 The 
opinion indicated that premium rates stemming from an unconstitutional 
statutory mandate7 could not stand. In addition, the reduction in in-
creased limits premiums was found to be "particularly inappropriate" 
because the savings anticipated under the no-fault system "can be ex-
pected to have no effect upon increased limits losses which continue to 
be assessed under traditional tort rules."8 
Since the 1972 rates were invalid because based on 1971 rates that 
reflected an inappropriate reduction, the plaintiffs requested that the 
Commissioner's decision simply be modified to reflect an elimination of 
the 1971 reduction. The Court rejected this suggestion, preferring in-
stead to allow the Commissioner to modify his own decision. The case 
was remanded to the Commissioner with an instruction "to make an ap-
propriate adjustment to offset the fifteen percent reduction mandated 
by St.1970, c. 670, §6."g 
§5.4. Taxation of insurance premiums: Status of dividends. In 
State Tax Commission v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 the Su-
preme Judicial Court was asked to interpret a statutory provision that 
imposed an excise tax on the premiums paid for life insurance policies 
allocable to Massachusetts.2 The statute defines the base on which the 
3 Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 1970 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1411, 1419, 263 N.E.2d 698, 703. See 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.1. 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1113, 283 N.E.2d 862. 
5 G.L., c. 175, § 113B. 
6 Id. at 1116, 283 N.E.2d at 864. 
7 See note 2, supr.a. 
8 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1113, 1116-1117,283 N.E.2d 862, 864. 
9 Id. at 1117, 283 N.E.2d at 864. 
§5.4. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 255, 279 N.E.2d 656. 
2 G.L., c. 63, §20 provides that a policy of a foreign insurer is allocable to 
Massachusetts if the insured is a Massachusetts resident. A policy of a domestic 
5
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excise tax is to be levied as "all amounts received as consideration for 
life insurance policies . . . [including] dividends applied to purchase ad-
ditional insurance or to shorten the premium paying period .... "3 How-
ever, confusion is introduced by subsequent language providing deductions 
for "dividends which . . . have been paid or credited to policyholders or 
applied to purchase additional insurance or to shorten the premium 
paying period."4 
Dividends of mutual insurance companies, such as the taxpayer in 
this case, are essentially returns to policyholders of overpayments of 
premiums. The amount of such dividends is determined only after the 
cost of providing the particular insurance coverage involved has been 
precisely established. These dividends may be withdrawn by the policy-
holder in cash or left with the insurer. If left with the insurer, the 
dividends may be withdrawn in cash with interest at some later date 
or they may be used to purchase additional insurance or annuity con-
tracts ,either when the dividend is declared or in later years. In the present 
case, a single issue was involved. In determining its tax liability for 1963, 
the taxpayer first deducted the full amount of all dividends paid in that 
year. In addition, it claimed a deduction for dividends declared in earlier 
years that had been left with the taxpayer and applied by policyholders 
to purchase paid-up insurance and annuity contracts during 1963. This, 
of course, represented the second time such amounts had been deducted. 
The State Tax Commission appealed a decision by the Appellate Tax 
Board upholding the taxpayer's second deduction. 
A literal reading of the less than artfully drafted statute gives some 
support to the taxpayer's contention that deductions for a single dividend 
in more than one year are not precluded.5 However, the Court, con-
sidered the provision as a whole, and reached an eminently reasonable 
conclusion. Focusing on the dynamics involved, the Court interpreted 
the language as merely permitting a deduction for the entire amount of 
dividends paid in the particular tax year, regardless of the disposition 
of such dividends by the policyholders involved. Further, it construed 
this blanket deduction as totally exhausting the taxpayer's deductions in 
respect to such dividends.6 As a result, if dividends left with the taxpayer 
insurer is allocable to Massachusetts unless the insured is a resident of another 
state or country to which the insurer actually pays an excise tax. 
3 Id. 
4Id. 
5 ''The word 'premiums' as used in this section shall include all amounts re-
ceived as consideration for life insurance policies . . . and shall include dividends 
applied to purchase additional insurance or to shorten the premium paying period 
. . . . In determining the amount of excise tax payable hereunder there shall be 
deducted, to the extent that they are properly allocable to premiums taxable 
hereunder, . . . (b) dividends which during said [preceding calendar] year have 
been paid or credited ,to policy holders or applied to purchase additional insur-
ance or to shorten the premium paying period." Id. 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 255, 259, 279 N.E.2d 656, 659. 
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during any year for which a deduction has already been taken are applied 
by the policyholder to purchase paid-up insurance or annuities, the 
amount so applied is re-characterized as new premium income subject 
to tax. 
The taxpayer also contended, unsuccessfully, that the statute was 
ambiguous and should therefore be construed in favor of the taxpayer.' 
While one may question the Court's conclusion that the statute was not 
ambiguous, it is more difficult to contest its further statement that, "[i]n 
any event, the rule cited by the taxpayer does not require or permit us 
to abandon the equally salutary basic rule of following a common sense 
approach in the interpretation and application of all statutes."8 
§5.5. Unfair or deceptive act or practice: Exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. The defendant insurer in Gordon v. Hardware Mutual 
Casualty Co.1 had in the late 1960's annually obtained permission from 
the Commissioner of Insurance to deviate from rates established by the 
appropriate rating organization for certain types of non compulsory 
motor vehicle liability insurance.2 The plaintiff had purchased such in-
surance from the defendant during these years, and had come to expect 
the approximately 15% reduction in premiums that had resulted from 
the rate deviations. However, the insurer sought no such reduction for 
1970. The plaintiff became aware of this only when he received his 
1970 policy, which included a notice of a premium that was higher than 
the previous year's. By the time he received the policy early in 1970, 
it was too late to seek other insurance from an insurer which had sought 
a rate reduction. Alleging that the failure to inform him that no reduc-
tion would be sought for 1970 was an "unfair or deceptive act or prac-
tice," the plaintiff brought a bill in equity in superior court under the 
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act.3 The plaintiff claimed as dam-
ages the difference between his 1970 premium and his 1969 premium. 
Upon the court's dismissal of the bill, the plaintiff appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal on 
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.4o Noting the "comprehensive statutory scheme" for the regula-
tion of insurance, and the broad supervisory powers given the Commis-
sioner of Insurance,5 the Court enumerated several specific statutory 
provisions which vested the Commissioner with authority to correct the 
alleged abuse including: (1) G.L., c. 175; §5 providing the Commissioner 
with power to revoke the license of a foreign insurance company such 
as the defendant; (2) G.L., c. 175 §§113B, and 113C, providing for 
, Id. at 260, 279 N.E.2d at 659, and cases cited therein. 
8 Id. at 260, 279 N.E.2d at 659. 
§5.5. I 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 281 N.E.2d 573. For another discussion of 
this case, see § 10.6 infra. 
2 Deviations from established rates are obtained under G.L., c. 175A. §9. 
3 G.L., c. 93A, §9. 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 762, 281 N.E.2d 573, 577. 
5 The insurance industry is regulated under G.L., cc. 174A-178. 
7
Wadsworth: Chapter 5: Insurance Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
100 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §5.6 
rate regulation with respect to certain coverages and for judicial re-
view; (3) G.L., c. 175A, §11 providing policyholders "aggrieved" by 
application of the rate system with the right to compel a hearing with 
the insurer and, if no satisfaction is obtained from the insurer, to compel 
a hearing before the Commissioner; and, (4) G.L., c. 176D, §9 provid-
ing the Commissioner with authority to hold hearings and to request 
the Attorney General to seek an injunction against any "unfair or de-
ceptive act or practice."6 In light of this statutory framework, the Court 
felt that judicial recognition of the cause of action would invade the 
province especially assigned to the Commissioner by the legislature. It 
was therefore reluctant to circumvent this expression of legislative will. 
The plaintiff argued that he should not be relegated to the adminis-
trative remedies cited by the Court, presumably since none of them 
allowed him to sue in his own right for the damage recovery which he 
sought under Chapter 93A. However, the test of administrative remedies 
in Massachusetts is not whether they are "in all respects as prompt and 
as broad" as the judicial alternatives, but whether they are adequate.7 
The Court did not find that "'futility apparent in the application of 
the statute' which 'makes such resort to the administrative agency un-
necessary.' "8 While one may question whether administrative relief would 
ultimately prove adequate in the present case, it is difficult to challenge 
the proposition that administrative remedies should first be exhausted. 
As stated by the Court, 
Exercise of ... [the Commissioner's] regulatory power may afford 
the plaintiff some measure of relief (if he is entitled to any relief) 
and, in any event, may affect the scope and character of any judicial 
relief which may be given.9 
§5.6. Authority to write additional line of business: Administrative 
discretion. In Rockland Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of Ins.,l 
the plaintiff's business, which consisted principally of writing automobile 
property damage insurance, was seriously jeopardized by the enactment 
of the "no-fault property damage law."2 Rockland's certificate of author-
6 Chapter 176D, enacted by Acts of 1947, c. 659, has essentially been re-
enacted in an expanded fonn by Acts of 1972, c. 543. See §5.12, infra. 
7 Jordan Marsh Co. v. Labor Relations Comm., 312 Mass. 597, 601-602, 45 
N.E.2d 925,926 (1942). 
8 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 761, 281 N.E.2d 573, 576, citing Boston Edison 
Co. v. Selectmen of Concord, 355 Mass. 79, 84, 242 N.E.2d 868, 872 (1968). 
The COUI1t was carefut to note that it did not accept plaintiff's assumption that 
the Commissioner had no power to order the rebate: "Nor need we consider 
whether the commissioner could, under G.L., c. 175A, § 11, require the defendant 
to make a rebate equivalent to the plaintiff's previous discount. We should not 
pass upon such questions without having .the benefit of a prior detennination by 
the commissioner." Id. 
9 Id. at 763, 281 N.E.2d at 577. 
§5.6. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1883, 277 N.E.2d 493. 
2 Acts of 1971, c. 978. 
8
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ity to write insurance did not expressly include the authority to write 
compulsory bodily injury motor vehicle liability insurance,3 which Rock-
land felt was necessary in order to remain a viable insurance carrier.4 
The Commissioner of Insurance denied Rockland's formal application 
to amend its certificate to include such coverage. Rockland then sought 
a writ of mandamus to compel the Commissioner either to amend its 
certificate, or to issue a ruling that such amendment is not necessary. 
The plaintiff appealed the superior court's dismissal of the writ. 
The principal controversy in the case was the meaning and interrela-
tionship of two sections of Chapter 175 of the General Laws. Section 
54C indicates that any insurer that meets certain financial and other re-
quirements5 "may insure" in respect to compulsory bodily injury motor 
vehicle liability insurance policies. On the other hand, Section 32 indicates 
that no domestic company "shall make or issue any contracts or policies 
of insurance ... until it has obtained from the Commissioner a certificate 
... authorizing it to make or issue such policies or contracts." This 
latter section also authorizes the Commissioner to refuse to issue such 
certificate if such issuance would be "prejudicial to the public interest."6 
The Commissioner refused Rockland's application under the "public 
interest" provision of Section 32. Rockland contended that Section 32 
applied only to the formation of insurers and, consequently, that the 
Commissioner may not require an application to amend its certificate 
under this section. 
Section 54C was initially adopted in 1945 as part of a program to 
allow multiple line underwriting by domestic companies already em-
powered to write certain lines. This section was interpreted by the Court 
as authorizing such companies to write the additional lines without formal 
amendment to the purposes and powers provisions of their charter docu-
ments'? In addition the Court found support for the proposition that 
Section 32 may have been intended to apply only at the time of in-
3 Rockland's certificate included authority to write insurance under G.L., c. 
175, §§47 (First, Second (b) and Eighth clauses), 54E and 54F. Compulsory 
bodily injury motor vehicle liability insurance of the type here involved is written 
under G.L., c. 175, §54C. 
4 Rockland apparently felt that its property damage coverage customers would 
switch to insurers that could also offer compulsory bodily injury coverage. 
5 The Court assumed that Rockland met these requirements. Id. at 1885, 277 
N.E.2d at 495. 
6 G.L., c. 175, §32. 
7 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1883, 1885-1886, 277 N.E.2d 493, 495-496. It should 
be noted that these charter· documents are not the same as the certificate of 
authority to write insurance required by Section 32. 
The Court also cited the Commissioner's report recommending the 1947 multiple-
line legislations, which stated, "'We believe that the privilege of multiple line 
underwriting, so called, should be afforded companies now in existence as they 
may see fit to take advantage of the privilege.''' (Emphasis added by the Court). 
Id. at 1887, 277 N.E.2d at 496. The Court found no indication in these words, 
or in the report generaUy, that any amendment of the Section 32 certificate was 
to be required as a "prerequisite of taking advantage of §54C." 
9
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corporation and not in respect to subsequent changes in the type of 
insurance written, whether or not any such change involved Section 540.8 
Despite these ambiguities which favored Rockland, the Court declined 
to grant the immediate relief requested. For years the Commissioner had 
in fact required amendments to a company's certificate whenever it 
desired to write a line of insurance not covered by the certificate, and 
the Court deferred to that established practice: 
[I]n a confused statutory situation, a consistent, long continued, ad-
ministrative practice of the public officer charged with regulating 
a large industry is not lightly to be disregarded and is entitled to 
weight in statutory interpretation.9 
The opinion also indicates a considerable reluctance to interpret the 
Commissioner's authority more narrowly than he contended was necessary 
to protect the public interest. Therefore the Court indicated that Rock-
land's proper course was to renew its application for amendment and to 
request a hearing before the Commissioner on its fitness to issue per-
sonal injury liability policies under Section 540.10 
A distinction should be kept in mind between the purposes and powers 
which may be included in an insurance company's charter and the par-
ticular lines of business which the Commissioner, by controlling the terms 
of an insurer's certificate of authority, may authorize a company to write. 
This distinction is inherent to the Massachusetts regulatory scheme, and 
control of that industry through the Section 32 certificate is an altogether 
reasonable regulatory technique. 
§5.7. Insurer's duty to defend and indemnify. Three cases decided 
by the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1973 SURVEY year concerned 
the duty of insurers to defend legal actions brought against their policy-
holders. In each case, the insurer had refused to defend and judgment 
had been entered against the insured for damages covered by the policy. 
In subsequent actions to recover on the policies, each insurer disclaimed 
liability alleging behavior on the part of the insured that had tended to 
materially prejudice the defense effort. 
In Lombardi v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.l the sole issue for the 
Court was an alleged breach by the insured of the cooperation clause 
8 ''For example, there is little or no basis for applying to a company already 
in operation (when it seeks an amendment of its certificate) the provision calling 
for the commissioner to determine 'that the company is without liabilities except' 
for organization expenses and (for some companies) its liabilities to stockholders 
for amounts paid in for shares." Id. at 1886, 277 N.E.2d at 496. 
9 Id. at 1890, 277 N.E.2d at 498. 
10 Id. at 1890-1891, 277 N.E.2d at 498-499. The Court also noted in passing 
that ce[ilf the commissioner is to continue to assert power to require amend-
ments of certificates issued under §32, there is obvious need for substantial legisla-
tive clarification of that section." Id. at 1888, 277 N.E.2d at 497. 
§5.7. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 461, 280 N.E.2d 149. 
10
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contained in a motor vehicle liability policy issued by Lumbermens.2 In 
an action by Lombardi against the insured, counsel for Lumbermens had 
withdrawn, disclaiming liability on the ground that its insured had 
changed his story regarding an automobile accident. Following judgment 
against the insured in the earlier case, bills to reach and apply Lumber-
mens' "obligation" to its insured were commenced by Lombardi. The 
Superior court's decision in favor of Lombardi was appealed by Lumber-
mens. The alleged breach of the cooperation clause was based upon 
discrepancies between the insured's statements contained in the accident 
report and his testimony at trial more than three years later. The insured 
testified at trial that he had had four bottles of beer on the night of the 
accident, whereas he had stated in the accident report that he had had 
only one.3 Although the" 'intentional furnishing of false information of 
a material nature either before or at trial is a breach of the cooperation 
clause,' "4 the court held that this discrepancy was not material in that 
there was no showing at trial that the insured's driving ability had been 
affected by the amount of beer consumed. One can only speculate 
whether the materiality of such discrepancy would have been established 
at trial had counsel for Lumbermens not withdrawn.s 
Airway Underwriters v. Perrf' appears to be a straight forward case 
hardly worthy of appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court. Perry at one 
time owned an airplane that he insured with Airway Underwriters. He 
then sold the airplane to friends, who shortly thereafter were injured when 
the plane crashed. The injured parties sued Perry and received sub-
stantial judgments. After some initial involvement, counsel for Airway 
had withdrawn from the case prior to trial. Airways then brought a bill 
for a declaration that it had no obligation to satisfy the judgments ob-
tained against its former insured in the earlier action. From a decision 
for Airways, Perry appealed. 
The Court found multiple reasons to relieve Airway of liability. Perry 
had actively assisted the injured parties in their suit against him. This 
2 The opinion does not quote the wording of the particular cooperation clause. 
In Couch on Insurance 2d, §51: 100 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Couch], it is 
said that u[I]iability insurance policies usually contain clauses which provide in 
substance, with some variations in language in the different policies, that the insured 
shall co-operate with the insurer and that, upon the insurer's request, the insured 
shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing 
and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses, and in the conduct 
of suits." 
3 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 461,463, 280 N.E.2d 149, 151. 
4 Id. at 462, 280 N.E.2d at 151, citing Cassidy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 
Mass. 139, 142, 154 N.E.2d 353, 355 (1958). 
5 Any attempt by counsel for Lumbermens to establish that the insured's driving 
ability had been affected by the beer would tend to prejudice the insured's case. 
A conflict of interest certainly would exist, and such an effort by counsel for 
Lumbermens might well amount to a breach of Lumbermens' duty to defend in 
good faith. 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1239, 284 N.E.2d 604. 
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assistance was found to constitute fraud and collusion, and the Court 
indicated that" '[i]t has always been the law of this Commonwealth that 
a surety or indemnitor could avoid a judgment rendered against the 
principal or indemnitee, by showing it was procured by collusion or 
fraud.'''7 Also, Perry was held to have violated the cooperation clause 
contained in the policy.8 Perry had moved from Massachusetts before 
the earlier action had been commenced, leaving no forwarding address. 
Airway's investigator located him some months later in Texas, and lo-
cated him once more after he had again moved without leaving an 
address; Airway withdrew from the earlier case upon Perry's third such 
disappearance. 9 
Finally, the policy which had been issued shortly before the sale, con-
tained a recital that Perry was the sole owner of the aircraft. Airways 
did not learn of the transfer of title until after the accident. The Court 
considered these facts sufficient to relieve Airways of any obligation to 
defend Perry.lO Curiously, however,the Court cited Faris v. Travelers 
lndem. Co.11 in support of this proposition. Faris appears to be inapposite, 
since it dealt with misrepresentation of ownership at the time the policy 
issued, and not a transfer after the policy had been issued. Faris held 
that such misrepresentation completely voided the policy, since it con-
stituted the failure of a condition precedent to the policy ever being 
effective.12 In Airways, however, there was no dispute that Perry was in 
fact the sole owner on the date the policy issued. It is well established 
that "A prohibition against alienation is distinct from a representation 
or warranty by the insured as to the nature or extent of his title or interest 
at the time of his applying for insurance."13 It may be that Perry's policy 
contained an alienation clause that precluded recovery upon transfer 
without due notice to Airways, or that Perry retained no "insurable in-
terest" after the transfer, but the Court failed to mention either of these 
possibilities. 
In the case of Blais v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,14 the plaintiff sued 
one Hamilton for damages arising from a fire. Quincy had been invited 
to defend that action on the ground that any liability of Hamilton would 
be covered by a fire insurance policy issued by Quincy to Hamilton's 
father. However, Quincy declined to defend, on the ground that Hamil-
ton was not an insured under its policy. The parties agreed that, al-
though there would be a judgment against Hamilton, the plaintiff would 
7 Id. at 1243, 284 N.E.2d at 607, citing Fistel v. Car and Gen. Ins. Corp., 304 
Mass. 458, 460, 23 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1939). 
8 Id. at 1243, 284 N.E. at 607. 
9 For another recent discussion of a breach of the cooperation clause in a 
motor vehicle liability insurance policy, see 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 11.3. 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1242, N.E.2d at 606-607. 
11 278 Mass. 204, 179 N.E.2d 605 (1932). 
12 Id. at 209, 179 N.E.2d at 607. 
13 Couch §37: 1046. 
14 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 195, 278 N.E.2d 746. 
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only attempt to recover on that judgment to the extent that Hamilton 
was covered under Quincy's policy. The plaintiff then brought a bill 
in equity to reach and apply Quincy's obligation to Hamilton. The trial 
court found that Hamilton was in fact covered by Quincy's policy, and 
Quincy did not perfect its appeal on this point. Quincy also argued that 
the judgment against the insured had been procured through bad faith 
and collusion.15 The trial judge found otherwise and the Supreme Judicial 
Court declined to hold that he was plainly wrong: "In the absence of 
fraud or collusion the insurer would be bound by a judgment entered by 
default .... A judgment by consent stands no worse."16 
§5.8. Fire insurance policy: Increase of hazard. In Gorton v. Phoenix 
Ins. Co.,! the plaintiff, a fish wholesaler, attempted to remodel a recently 
purchased building to accommodate fish freezers. To this end, a massive 
concrete block, used as a hydraulic counterweight by the former owrier, 
had to be removed. Unfortunately, the single dynamite blast calculated 
to break up the block also totally demolished the building. The plaintiff 
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts on a fire insurance policy issued by the defendant for so much 
of the loss as exceeded the minor damage which had been anticipated.-
Liability was disclaimed under a clause in the policy that provided that 
Phoenix" 'shall not be liable for loss occurring (a) while the hazard is 
increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the in-
sured .. .'''2 
Although the plaintiff had been told by the blaster, who was a licensed 
professional, that only minor damage would occur, the federal district 
court found that a reasonable man should have been apprehensive and 
expected more than minor damage.3 Indeed, there was evidence that the 
plaintiff was in fact apprehensive. On two occasions he talked to his in-
surance advisor (who was not a Phoenix agent), seeking assurance that 
the fire insurance policy in question would cover any damage caused by 
the blast. Furthermore, the blaster required the plaintiff to execute a 
release as to any property damage which might result from the explosion. 
The court concluded that this amounted to an increase in hazard within 
the policy terms.o4 In response, the plaintiff argued that, despite the "in-
15 It is interesting to note that some courts would not even have allowed the 
defense of collusion to be raised in the present case. For example, in Ocean Acci. 
and G. Corp. v. Torres, 91 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 302 U.S. 741 (1937), 
the insurer, invited to defend an action against the insured, declined on the basis 
that the policy did not cover the particular loss involved. In a subsequent suit 
against the insurer on the policy, the circuit court dismissed the defense of collu-
sion summarily: "The . . . [insurer] cannot be heard to complain that the suit 
which it was invited to defend was collusive." Id. at 471. 
16 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 195, 197, 278 N.E.2d 746, 747. (Citations omitted). 
§5.8. 1 339 F. Supp. 241 (D. Mass. 1972). 
2 Id. at 244. 
3Id. 
4 The question of whether a hazard is increased is to be determined by the 
standard of the reasonable man. CIA provision avoiding insurance because of an 
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crease in hazard" clause in the policy, the defendant was liable under a 
"repairs" clause. The Supreme Judicial Court had previously interpreted 
a similar "repairs" clause to pennit "construction in a reasonable, proper 
and usual way even though such construction may increase the hazard."5 
Thus the issue for the Court was whether the blasting was a "usual, rea-
sonable and proper" method of achieving the desired alteration. The 
plaintiff contended that it was, at least when conducted by a licensed 
blaster, as in the present case. The court rejected this argument, referring 
to considerable authority that characterized blasting as an ultra-hazardous 
activity and not a part of the ordinary building process.6 
The Court did not foreclose the possibility that blasting, or even that 
the method of blasting employed in the present case, could ever be "rea-
sonable, proper or usual" within the scope of a "repairs" clause. Never-
theless' it did apply the authorities cited, since the plaintiff offered no 
evidence to the contrary. Since the blasting was an increase in hazard, 
and since it was not covered by the "repairs" clause in the policy, the 
court held the defendant not liable for the loss.7 
§5.9. Motor vehicle liability insurance: Scope of "loading and un-
loading" clause. In LaPointe v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co.,l a motor vehicle 
owned by the plaintiff was insured by the defendant under a policy that 
covered liability arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, which ex-
pressly included "the loading and unloading thereof."2 The insured 
vehicle, a truck, was used by an employee of the plaintiff to deliver a 
tank of propane gas to a dwelling. Unfortunately, the employee mis-
takenly installed the replacement tank at the wrong location. This mistake 
resulted in an explosion four hours later that caused both property 
damage and personal injuries. LaPointe, the employer, paid for the 
damage in settlement of a suit brought against him by the in jured parties. 
He then sought a declaration that the defendant was liable under the 
insurance policy. From a decree granting such declaration, the defendant 
appealed. 
The major issue on appeal was the scope of the "loading and un-
alteration in the situation or circumstances which would increase the risk con-
templates such alteration as woul\:!. materially and substantially enhance the 
hazard, as viewed by a person of ordinary intelligence, care, and diligence." 
Couch 137:695. It should be noted that the policy language in the present case 
voided coverage, whether or not the insured had knowledge of the increase of 
hazard, so long as he had "contro!''' Since Gorton had control over the blasting 
operation, it would appear that the court's reference to the defendant's knowledge 
of the risk, 339 F. Supp. at 244, was unnecessary to the decision. 
5 Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 351 Mass. 113, 119, 
218 N.E.2d 64, 67 (1966). 
6 339 F. Supp. 241, 245 (D. Mass. 1972), citing Restatement of Torts, §§519, 
520 (1938), and Restatement of Torts 2d, §§427, 427A (1966). 
7 Id. at 246. 
15.9. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 731, 281 N.E.2d 253. 
2 Id. at 734, 281 N.E.2d at 256. 
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loading" proVISIon in the insurance policy. In an earlier case dealing 
with the interpretation of a similar provision, the Court had adopted the 
complete operation rule,3 as opposed to the coming to rest rule.4 The 
complete operation rule defines the operation of unloading as a "con-
tinuous transaction ending with the deposit of the goods in the hands 
of the purchaser."5 In the present case, application of this test resulted 
virtually automatically in a holding that the loss was covered, since the 
tank of gas had never been delivered to the actual purchaser.6 
Thus under the complete operation rule, the scope of the "loading 
and unloading" clause must be considered to be very broad, and to extend 
coverage substantially beyond the coverage afforded in the absence of 
the clause. One limitation, however, does exist: "There must be a causal 
connection between the use of the automobile, which includes loading 
and unloading, and the accident."7 In the present case, the defendant 
argued that no such causal connection existed, since the loss arose, not 
from the unloading of the truck, but from the failure of the plaintiff to 
give his employee more explicit directions. The Court first noted that 
the question was not that of "proximate cause" in the usual tort sense. 
Then, drawing from two earlier federal cases8 that purported to apply 
Massachusetts law,tthe Court held that it was sufficient that "installation 
of the tanks was 'necessary in order to carry out the delivery' and was 
'an integral part of the unloading process.' "9 
Finally, the defendant argued that it had not received timely notice 
of the accident, and was therefore excused from liability. The relevant 
policy clause required that notice be given "as soon as practical;" in 
Massachusetts, this has been interpreted to mean within a reasonable 
time.10 Although the plaintiff had delayed approximately one month 
before sending written notice of the accident to the defendant, he had 
discussed the accident with one of defendant's agents a day or two after 
the accident. The Court experienced no difficulty in holding that notice 
3 August A. Busch and Co. of Mass., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 
239, 158 N.E.2d 351 (1959). The "complete operation" rule is often viewed as 
the modem, or the majority, rule. 
4 "Under the coming to rest doctrine, the term 'unloading' within the meaning 
of a motor vehicle liability policy comprises only the actual removing or lifting 
of the artide from the motor vehicle up to the moment when the goods which 
were taken off the vehicle have actually come to rest and every connection of 
the motor vehicle with the process of unloading has ceased, and does not include 
any further handling of the goods incidental to their delivery to their destination." 
Couch §45: 127. 
5 August A. Busch and Co. of Mass., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 339 Mass 
239, 243, 158 N.E.2d 351, 354 (1959). 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 731, 735, 281 N.E.2d 253, 256. 
7 Id. at 736, 281 N.E.2d at 257. 
8 Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Lee, 168 F.2d 420 (1st Cir. 1948); Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. Ltd., 252F.2d463 (lstCir. 
1958) . 
9 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 731, 736, 281 N.E.2d 253, 257. 
10 Segal v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 337 Mass. 185, 148 N.E.2d 659 (1958). 
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had been timely, referring not only to the vagueness of the "loading and 
unloading" clause, which might easily confuse a layman, but also to the 
fact that the defendant's agent had not informed the plaintiff of possible 
insurance coverage. 
§5.1O. Motor vehicle liability insurance: Policy interpretation: Scope 
of coverage and the effect of an "excess insurance" clause. By definition, 
"liability" insurance involves the indemnification of the insured for 
liability to others, rather than the payment of losses for the insured's 
own physical injury or property damage. However, many automobile 
liability insurance policies contain an omnibus clause providing that the 
term "insured" includes any other person who uses the automobile with 
the named insured's consent. The question then arises whether the 
named insured may recover for his personal losses when he is injured 
while he is a passenger in his own car if the injury was caused by the 
negligence of an omnibus insured. In 1935, the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that an owner who had obtained a judgment against the driver of 
his automobile eould not prevail in a subsequent action based on this 
judgment against his own insurer.1 That policy was a compulsory liability 
insurance policy whose terms were prescribed by statute,2 and the de-
cision was therefore an interpretation of the statute on which the policy 
was based. Referring to the legislative intent "to provide a degree of 
certainty of compensation to those who, rightfully and carefully using 
the ways, are injured by the carelessness of operators of motor vehicles,"3 
the Court held that, even when riding as a passenger in his own car, the 
named insured could not recover under a policy that provided protection 
to "others."4 
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. No.rfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 5 
decided this year, arose on similar facts. The owner-passenger obtained 
a judgment against the driver for personal injuries. The judgment was 
satisfied by the driver's automobile insurer, which, as a subrogee, brought 
the present action to establish the liability of the owner's insurer. How-
ever, this action was based upon noncompulsory liability insurance cover-
age whose terms were not prescribed by statute. For that reason, the 
issue of liability was solely a matter of policy construction. The policy 
provided coverage for the insured's liability for" 'damages because of 
bodily injury ... sustained by any person'."6 The words "any person" 
were held to indicate the insurer's intention to provide broader coverage 
§5.10. 1 MacBey v. Hartford Acci. and Indem. Co., 292 Mass. 105, 197 N.E. 
516 (1935). 
2 G.L., c. 90, §34A. Under this section, insurance is provided to " ... the 
insured and any person responsible for the operation of the insured's motor vehicle 
with his express or implied consent against loss by reason of the liability to pay 
damages to others for bodily injuries." (Emphasis added). 
3 292 Mass. 105, 107, 197 N.E. 516, 517 (1935). 
4 Id. at 108, 197 N.E.2d at 518. 
5 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 273, 279 N.E.2d 686. 
6 Id. at 274, fn. 4, 279 N.E.2d at 688, fn. 4. (Emphasis added by the Court). 
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than that afforded by the tenn "others" which is used in compulsory 
coverage. Referring to the established principle that language drafted 
by the insurer "is strictly construed and all ambiguities are resolved 
against the insurer,"7 the Court held that "any person" included the 
owner in the coverage of the policy.8 
In holding that the owner's policy covered his losses the Court created 
a further issue: how to distribute the losses between the two insurers 
involved. The driver's insurer had already paid for the owner's losses 
because the driver's policy on his own car covered this risk,9 and, as 
indicated, the owner's losses were also covered by his own policy. The 
policies of both insurers contained identical "other insurance" clauses,lO 
the effect of which, by themselves, would be to pro-rate the amount of 
the loss by comparing the maximum liability provisions of each policy to 
the total of the maximum liabilities of each policy.ll However, the driver's 
policy also contained an "excess insurance" clause, which provided that 
" 'the insurance with respect to . . . other motor vehicles under Insuring 
Agreement IV shall be excess insurance over any other valid and col-
lectible insurance.' "12 Insuring Agreement IV was the provision in the 
driver's policy that covered the loss sustained by the owner. Accordingly, 
the driver's insurance coverage with his own insurance company was 
held to be "excess insurance"13 and the coverage provided by the owner's 
insurance was the primary source of recovery.14 
§5.11. Miscellaneous Cases. In McDonough v. Hardware Dealers 
Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,! at issue was recovery under a standard Massa-
7 Id. at 275, 279 N.E.2d at 688. 
BId. at 276, 279 N.E.2d at 688. 
9 " ••• 'such insurance as is afforded by this policy ... applies with respect 
to any other motor vehicle ... provided ..• [the insured's] actual operation •.. 
is with the permission, or reasonably believed to be with the permission, of the 
owner and is within the scope of such permission.''' Id. at 277, fn. 7, 279 N.E.2d 
at 689, fn. 7. 
10 " .•• 'If the insured has other insur3ill.ce against a loss covered by this policy 
the company shaIl not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of such 
loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the 
total applicable limit of liability of a1l' valid and collectible insurance against such 
loss.''' Id. at 276, fn. 5, 279 N.E.2d at 689, fn. 5. 
11 For a general discussion of apportionment, see Couch §62: 1 et seq. 
12 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 273, 276, 279 N.E.2d 686, 689. 
13 "Where, as in the instant case, the driver does not own the vehicle he was 
driving in the accident, the coverage on the car is primary while the coverage 
of the driver is excess as between two automobile insurers whose policies contain 
identical 'other insurance' clauses." 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 273, 276, 279 N.E.2d 
686, 688-689. For a case involving apportionment between insurers when there 
are "other insurance" provisions but no applicable "excess insurance" provisions, 
see Kenner v. Century Indem. Co., 320 Mass. 6, 67 N.E.2d 769 (1946). 
14 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 273, 276, 279 N.E.2d 686, 689. The actual amount of 
damages was well below the maximum liability under the owner's policy. Id. at 
274, fn. 3, 279 N.E.2d at 687, fn. 3. Therefore, the owner's insurer was also the 
early source of recovery. 
§5.11. 1 448 F.2d 870 (1st Cir. 1971). 
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chusetts fire insurance policy2 for damages to the insured plaintiff's prem-
ises caused by water used in extinguishing a fire in a nearby building. 
The defendant insurer admitted liability for the immediate water damage 
to the plaintiff's building but contested liability for damages to the build-
ing's foundation occurring several months after the fire. The insurer 
argued that liability for this subsequent water damage was excluded by 
the policy.3 
The trial court first suggested that the policy exclusion was "unam-
biguous in the company's favor,"4 but then derogated from its unequivocal 
statement to characterize this construction as "quite as reasonable as the 
restricted construction urged by plaintiff."5 On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, indicating that the wrong ap-
proach had been used. The test approved by this court was: "[i]f there 
is a reasonable construction of the policy other than the literal one which 
is more favorable to the insured, under familiar principles he is entitled 
to it."6 Considering the fact that water damage incidental to fire is 
normally within 'such policies and reading the particular exclusion in the 
light of other exclusions relating to water,7 the court determined that the 
exclusion was ambiguous and that plaintiff was therefore entitled to re-
cover. The insurer, when drafting the policy, could easily have avoided 
the ambiguity by the use of a few simple words. 
In Howard v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc.,8 the insured, a member of the 
United States Air Force, had been a crew member of a patrol aircraft 
that was forced to ditch in the 'ocean because of mechanical failure. Al-
though the insured survived the crash uninjured, some eight to ten hours 
later he drowned. At issue was recovery by the beneficiary under an 
accidental death benefit clause that excluded recovery when death " 're-
sulted from ... travel or flight in, or descent from, any aircraft of which 
the Insured was a . . . member of the crew . . . .'''9 The scope of the 
"aviation clause" was a novel question in Massachusetts, and the de-
cisions in other jurisdictions were not uniform.1O 
The plaintiff argued that, since the insured survived the crash and 
died from drowning, the causal chain between the insured's serving as a 
2 The statutory requirements for such a policy are set forth in G.L., c. 175, §99. 
3 The policy excluded recovery for .. '[1]oss caused by, resulting from, con-
tributed to or aggravated by •.• water below the surface of the ground ..•. ' .. 




7 Other exclusions of losses resulting from water damage which were found in 
the same section of the policy that included the present exclusion, related only to 
damage from water that was not related to a fire, such as floods and sewer back-
ups. Id. 
8 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1589, 274 N.E.2d 819. 
9 Id. at 1590, 274 N.E.2d at 820. 
10 For a general discussion of policy exclusions relating to aircraft and aviation, 
see Couch §41 :541 et seq. 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 8
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/8
§5.11 INSURANCE LAWS 111 
crew member on an aircraft and his death had been broken. Specifically, 
the plaintiff raised the malfunction of the insured's exposure suit as an 
independent, and hence intervening, cause of death. The Court first noted 
that such malfunction had not been factually established. More im-
portantly, the Court intimated that even if the malfunctioning exposure 
suit had intervened, such intervention would not change the Court's 
determination that the crash was the "legal cause" of death.11 While 
perhaps not going so far a:s to approve a "but for" test, the Court did 
indicate a willingness to interpret the exclusion in a way highly favorable 
to the insurer. This willingness is best illustrated by the following quota-
tion, cited with approval 'and taken from an opinion of the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in an analogous case: 
"In undertaking an aerial flight over the ocean in a land-based plane, 
man must reckon with the perils of the sea .... That men may re-
main alive for varying periods of time before succumbing does not 
change the picture. We think it a rather violent fiction to say that 
death, under such circumstances, comes from accidental drowning."12 
Whitehall Co., Ltd. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.lS involved the inter-
pretation of an insurance policy that covered goods "in transit" and 
"during transportation." A sealed trailer rented by the plaintiff insured, 
containing cases of whiskey, was stolen from a railroad yard two weeks 
after it had arrived at Boston by flat-car. The Court held that there was 
no liability on the part of the insurer, since, when stolen, the trailer was 
no longer in transit: "'The natural meaning of the words "transit" and 
"transportation" . . . is that it shall be in' the course of movement by 
some kind of carriage from one place to another.' "14 
Boston Camping Distributor Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co'. IS in-
volved a rather obvious interpretation of a clause in a general liability 
policy excluding liability for loss caused by "'the discharge . . . of 
water . . . from automatic sprinkler systems.' "16 The Court held for the 
insurer, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that a negligent act of one of 
its employees in actuating the sprinkler, rather than the sprinkler system 
discharge, was the direct cause of the loss.17 
Colsch v. Travelers Ins. 18 involved a suit by Colsch against the de-
fendant insurer alleging that in several respects the insurer's conduct of 
the defense in an earlier action against Colsch had been bungled. The 
11 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1589, 1591, 274 N.E.2d 819, 820. 
12 Id. at 1592, 274 N.E.2d at 821, citing Order of United Commercial Travelers 
v. King, 161 F.2d 108, 109 (4th Cir. 1947), affirmed 333 U.S. 153 (1948). 
13 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 647, 281 N.E.2d 234. 
14 Id. at 647, 281 N.E.2d at 235, citing Koshland v. Columbia Ins. Co., 237 
Mass. 467, 472, 130 N.E. 41,43 (1921). 
15 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 973, 282 N.E.2d 374. 
16 Id. at 975, 282 N.E.2d at 375. 
17 Id. at 975, 282 N.E.2d at 376. 
18 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 778, 281 N.E.2d 593. 
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Court, in the process of sustaining the defendant's demurrer, set forth 
what must be established for liability in such a situation: 
"[O]ne who seeks to hold another responsible for neglect in the 
conduct of litigation must show that the action which has been 
neglected would probably have been successful, and therefore that 
its neglect has directly resulted in damages measured by the value 
or amount of the rights which were lost by the default."l9 
B. LEGISLATION 
§5.12. Unfair acts or practices. In response to the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,l passed by Congress in 1945, the Massachusetts legislature 
in 1947 enacted G.L., c. 176D, entitled "Unfair Methods of Competition 
and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of In-
surance."2 During the 1972 SURVEY year the legislature essentially re-
enacted Chapter 176D, with various modifications and additions.3 At the 
heart of the new statute are Sections 2, 3 and 6. Section 2 provides that 
no person may engage in any unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
insurance business. Section 3 sets forth an extensive list of practices ex· 
pressly defined to be unfair or deceptive. Section 6 provides the. Com-
missioner of Insurance with the means of establishing whether any other 
acts or practices not defined in Section 3 are unfair or deceptive.4-
Many of the acts and practices defined in Section 3 as unfair are 
simply carry-overs from the earlier legislation.5 However, several signi-
ficant new categories have been added. For example, Chapter 176D now 
extensively defines unfair claim settlement practices: it is now an unfair 
or deceptive act or practice to compel " ... insureds to institute litigation 
to recover amounts due under an insurance policy by offering sub-
stantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought 
by such insureds,"6 or to refuse " ... to pay claims without conducting 
a reasonable investigation based upon all available information.'" Further, 
19 Id. at 779, 281 N.E.2d at 594, citing McAleenan v. Mass. Bonding and Ins. 
Co., 232 N.Y. 199, 204-205, 133 N.E. 444, 446 (1921). 
§5.12. 1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011·1015. In the anti-trust and unfair business prac-
tices areas, the McCarran-Ferguson Act limits federal control over the insurance 
industry only to the extent that state regulation exists. For a recent discussion 
of the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§11.20. 
2 Acts of 1947, c. 6.59. 
3 Acts of 1972, c. 543. 
4- Under Section 6, the Commissioner may hold a hearing on a suspect act 
or practice whenever he ce ••• shall have reason to believe that any such person 
has engaged or is engaging in this commonwealth in any unfair method of 
competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice ... and that a proceeding 
by him in respect thereto would be in the interest of the public." 
5 G.L., c. 176D, §§3 (1 )-(8) are substantially the same as subsections a and 
b of Section 4 of the old Chapter 176D (Acts of 1947, c. 659). 
6 G.L., c. 176D, §3(9) (g). 
7 Id., §3 (9)(d). 
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in response to the increasing interest of insurance regulators in the com-
plaint handling procedures of insurers, the new Act defines as unfair 
the failure to keep complete records concerning the receipt, processing 
and disposition of all complaints.8 
While the old Chapter 176D established a fairly expeditious means to 
combat those unfair or deceptive acts or practices expressly defined in the 
statute,9 a substantially more cumbersome technique was prescribed to 
combat other unfair or deceptive acts or practices.10 The new Chapter 
176D, however, gives the Commissioner of Insurance the power to issue 
cease and desist orders against any act or practice which he finds to be 
unfair or deceptive, whether or not it is so defined in the statute.11 Any 
such order is subject to judicial review;l2 and once the order becomes 
final, any violation subjects the violator to a maximum fine of $10,000.13 
The provisions of the new Chapter 176D are substantially those of 
the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act approved by the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in December of 1971. The 
only differences of any significance relate to the fines and damages that 
may be imposed on recalcitrant insurers. For example, in an action to 
recover on an insurance policy, a court may award up to twenty-five per-
cent of the claim as punitive damages under Chapter 176D if the plain-
tiff was damaged by an act or practice determined by the Commissioner 
to be unfair or deceptive.l4 The NAIC Model Act contains no such 
punitive damages provision. In addition, Chapter 176D requires the 
Commissioner to assess a fine of not more than $1,000 for "each and 
every" unfair or deceptive act or practice.15 Under the NAIC Model 
Act the maximum aggregate fine would be $10,000, or, for "knowing" 
violations, $50,000. 
The size of a fine under Chapter 176D could be astronomical, for 
example, in the case of an offending brochure that was widely distributed. 
The answer, of course, is that the Commissioner would never impose a 
maximum penalty in such a situation. In a sense, this last observation 
may be made of many sections in the new chapter. Some will charac-
terize the legislation as a strong, consumer-oriented measure that gives 
8 Id., §3 (10). 
9 Under Sections 6 and 7 of the old Chapter 176D, (Acts of 1947, c. 659) the 
Commissioner could, after a hearing, issue a cease and desist order to any person 
found to be engaging in an act or practice defined by the statute as unfair or 
deceptive. 
10 If, after a hearing, the Commissioner found that an act or practice not de-
fined in the statute was in fact unfair or deceptive, Section 9 of the old Chapter 
176D (Acts of 1947, c. 659) required him to seek, through the Attorney General, 
an injunction against such act or practice in the Supreme Judicial Court. 
11 G.L., c. 176D, §7. 
12 Id., §§8-9. 
13 Id., §10. 
14 Id., §7. In order for this provision to be applicable, the act or practice 
detennined to be unfair or deceptive must have been defined as such in the statute. 
15 Id. 
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the Commissioner the necessary power to deal with abuses. Others will 
characterize it as an attempt to enforce good business procedures by 
legislation and, hence, an example of legislative "over-kill." In any event, 
the Commissioner has been given a very inclusive statute, the beneficial 
impact of which depends essentially on the reasonable, impartial and 
consistent exercise of the Commissioner's discretion. 
§5.13. Life insurance: Issuance to mentally retarded minors. Legis-
lation passed during the 1972 SURVEY year prohibits Massachusetts life 
insurers from refusing to insure the life of any Massachusetts minor for 
the sole reason of mental retardation.1 The prohibition applies only if the 
minor is at least 3 years old, if there is no other insurance in force or 
pending on the life of the minor, and only if the amount of the insurance 
applied for is "exactly" $1,500. The choice of the figure of $1,500 makes 
it clear that, in essence, this mandatory coverage is "burial insurance." 
Because of the limited amount of the insurance involved, and because 
of its limited applicability, this particular piece of legislation is not 
significant in itself. The type of legislative action involved, however, is 
somewhat more controversial. While insurance companies, consistent with 
sound underwriting standards, have been issuing life insurance to many 
mentally retarded persons for years, such coverage has been denied in 
respect to the severely retarded who, as a group, have demonstrated a high 
mortality rate. In effect, Chapter 804 requires insurers to ignore sound un-
derwriting standards. If this trend were continued, insurers might be re-
quired in the future to issue insurance in larger face amounts, on lives 
in other high-risk categories including persons afflicted with epilepsy, 
muscular dystrophy, cerebral palsy, and the like.2 Under fundamental 
principles of insurance underwriting, premium charges for a given amount 
of insurance mount rapidly as the risk increases until, in respect to severe 
retardation or to young persons in other high-risk categories, such pre-
miums are a significant percentage of the face amount of coverage. This 
kind of insurance is also very expensive for companies to write because 
the policy is small and the underwriting effort is unusually large. Since 
Chapter 804 does not limit the amount of premiums that may be charged, 
it should be expected to produce life insurance that is relatively expensive. 
15.13. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 804. 
2 Public policy considerations are also relevant to the type of legislative man-
date involved here. Before anyone may insure the life of a third person for his 
own benefit, the law requires that he have an "insurable interest" in the life 
of the insured. Couch §24: 118. "A person has an insurable interest in the life 
of another if he can reasonably expect to receive pecuniary gain from the con-
tinued life of the other person and conversely, if he would suffer financial loss 
from the latter's death." Id. §24: 119. This insurable interest requirement is 
probably no bar to insurance under Chapter 804, given the relatively small 
amount of coverage involved. Generally the insurable interest must be "substantial 
in relation to the amount of the insurance." Id. 124: 2. This requirement could 
create problems if, for example, the legislature decided to mandate relatively 
large insurance coverage for seriously impaired lives. 
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§5.14. Termination of employment: Notice of continued group cov-
erage. Under the statutory scheme that governs certain types of group 
insurance, an insured leaving the group often remains covered for a period 
of time after his departure. 1 Chapter 353 of the Acts of 19722 requires any 
employer who terminates the employment to notify that employee, within 
ten business days, "of the date upon which his coverage under his group 
insurance policy shall terminate." 
Chapter 353 is not totally free from ambiguity regarding the circum-
stances under which notice must be given. The statute applies only to an 
employer "terminating employment of an employee." It would thus 
appear to apply only when an employee is fired, and not when he volun-
tarily leaves his job. Under G.L., c. 175, §134, however, group life 
coverage continues for 31 days after the "termination of employment," 
which seems to include a termination brought on by the employee. 
A curious feature of the notice provision is that, although it deals with 
insurance coverage, it is placed under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner 
of Labor and Industries, and not the Commissioner of Insurance.3 How-
ever, this feature is not altogether unreasonable inasmuch as the De-
partment of Labor and Industries regulates many aspects of the 
employer-employee relationship.4 
§5.15. Preclusion of banking institutions from certain insurance ac-
tivities. Chapter 718 of the Acts of 19721 is calculated to restrict bank-
ing institutions from competing with the insurance industry in respect to 
the sale of many types of insurance. It prohibits virtually all banking 
institutions2 from becoming licensed insurance agents or brokers, except 
for the sale of accident, health and life insurance. This prohibition also 
applies to the officers and employees of such banking institutions, if ten 
percent or more of such person's aggregate net insurance commissions 
would arise from insurance written "on behalf of such bank or any of its 
borrowers. " 
§5.14. 1 For example, under G.L., c. 175, §llOD, an elderly person insured 
as a member of a group against accident or sickness under G.L., c. 175, §110C, 
remains covered for 31 days after leaving the group. Also, under G.L., c. 175, 
1134, group life insurance coverage continues for 31 days after an insured mem-
ber leaves the group. (This last provision should not be confused with the right 
given a former member, under the same Section 134, to obtain within 31 days 
of departure an equivalent individual life insurance policy without evidence of 
insurability) . 
2 Adding §l78 0 to G.L., c. 149. 
3 Chapter 353 designates the new provision as G.L., c. 149, §178 O. G.L., c. 
149 relates to labor and industries generally, and its provisions are administered 
by the Department of Labor and Industries. 
4 For example, the power to assure that dividends on group insurance policies 
inure exclusively to the benefit of the insured persons is also given to the Com-
missioner of Labor and Industries. G.L., c. 149, §178E. 
15.15. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 718, §t, adding §174E to G.L., c. 175. 
2 Chapter 718 applies to all federal and state banks, savings and loan associa-
tions, bank holding companies and their affiliates, credit unions, small loan com-
panies and all organizations "controlI'ed" by the foregoing. 
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The new Section 174E makes it clear that licensed agents and brokers 
may serve as directors of banking institutions and that loans may be 
made by such institutions to such agents and brokers. Also included in 
the statute are extensive provisions to assure that a banking institution 
which acquires the assets of a licensed agent or broker by foreclosure on a 
defaulted loan will dispose of such assets within one year.3 
Apparently as a compromise between banking and insurance interests, 
a "grandfather clause" was included in Chapter 718.4 Thus the pro-
hibitions of the Act do not apply to institutions and individuals holding 
agent or broker licenses on the effective date of the Act, October of 1972. 
Chapter 718 represents yet another skirmish in the continuing conflict 
between banking and insurance interests, brought on particularly by the 
former's efforts to provide a broader range of services. This conflict is 
also reflected in the continuing efforts by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System to determine those types of insurance activities 
that may appropriately be carried on by affiliates of federal bank holding 
companies.5 
§5.16. Acts affecting motor vehicle liability insurance. Many minor 
legislative changes were made during the 1972 SURVEY year relative to 
the statutory scheme of motor vehicle liability insurance coverage in 
Massachusetts. Most of these changes represented refinements of the no-
fault approach effective in 1971 for personal injury coverage,! and in 
1972 for property damage coverage.2 
Under G.L., c. 90, §34M, the basic no-fault personal injury protection 
provision of the General Laws, benefits become due and payable from 
an insurer "upon receipt of reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
expenses and loss incurred." Any insured who remains unpaid for more 
than thirty days after benefits become payable may commence an action 
against the insurer to compel payment. Chapters 313 and 319 of the Acts 
of 1972 were intended to expedite the payment process under Section 
34M. Chapter 3133 provides that, if the insurer is notified of the disability 
of the insured by a licensed physician, it must either begin medical pay-
ments within 10 days or notify the insured of its reasons for nonpayment. 
Chapter 3194 gives the right to a speedy trial to an insured bringing an 
3 Chapter 718 gives the Commissioner of Insurance the power to extend this 
one year requirement, if ce ••• the interests of such bank or debtor will suffer 
materially by a forced sale of such property." 
4 Acts of 1972, c. 718, 12. 
5 The Federal Reserve Board has the power to determine what insurance 
activities are ce ••• so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks 
as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. 11843(c) (8). For some attempts 
to do so, see Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. §222.1 Bt seq. 
15.16. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 670. For an analysis of the no-fault personal injury 
protection coverage, see 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 1§22.1 et. seq. 
2 Acts of 1971, c. 978. For an analysis of the no-fault property damage coverage, 
see 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.19. 
3 Acts of 1972, c. 313, amending G.L., c. 90, 134M. 
4 Acts of 1972, c. 319, amending G.L., c. 90, §34M. 
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actiDn under §34M; it also specifies that if the insured reCDvers a judg-
ment fDr any amount in such action, the insurer must also pay his "costs 
and reasDnable attDrney's fees." 
SectiDn 34M was further amended by Chapter 339 Df the Acts Df 1972. 
As originally enacted, Section 34M prDvided personal injury protection 
subject to' a deductible $250, $500, $1,000, Dr $2,000, at the pDlicyholder's 
Dption. Chapter 339 further extends the potential cDverage available by 
adding a deductible Df $100 to' the pDlicyhDlder's options. 
An interesting aspect Df the no-fault persDnal injury cDverage enacted 
by Chapter 670 of the Acts of 1970 is the treatment Df wages lost be-
cause of injury.5 The recDvery of lost wages is specifically provided for 
in G.L., c. 90, §34A,6 unless such wages are recoverable under a wage 
cDntinuation program. Consistent with this exclusiDn from coverage, 
Chapter 451 of the Acts of 19727 directs the CDmmissioner of Insurance 
to establish a separate risk categDry fDr those whO' establish that they 
are entitled to' a cDntinuatiDn Df wages under a prDgram that prDvides 
at least 2 weeks of cDmpensatiDn fDr disability. If an insured pays pre-
miums based on this lower risk category and subsequently discDvers that 
his wage cDntinuatiDn program dDes nDt apply, he may recover IDst wages 
under no-fault by paying the additiDnal premiums that he would have 
paid if he were nDt subject to' the IDwer risk category. AlthDugh the 
legislative intent expressed in Chapter 451 is laudable, an insured must 
produce "evidence that. he qualifies to' be placed in such classification" 
to' qualify fDr the IDwer risk categDry. Many insureds may nDt feel that 
the modest premium reductiDn invDlved is wDrth the effDrt Df producing 
such evidence. 
ND-fault concepts were intrDduced intO' the coverage of property dam-
age to' motDr vehicles by Chapter 978 Df the Acts of 1971.8 The rates 
that may be charged fDr such cDverage are set by the CDmmissiDner under 
G.L., c. 175, § 113E. Chapter 423 Df the Acts of 1972 amends SectiDn 
113B to' provide for "an apprDpriate reductiDn in the premium charges 
cDvering such vehicles which [the CommissiDner] finds are less damage-
able than Dthers due to' safety features incDrpDrated intO' such vehicles." 
As Driginally filed this legislatiDn cDntained many questiDnable features, 
mDst Df which were eliminated by amendment.9 The Driginal bill did, 
hDwever, condition the reductiDns on cDmpliance with federal mDtDr 
vehicle safety standards,lO and that criterion, unfDrtunately, was alsO' 
eliminated. Unguided by any criteria, the CDmmissiDner will predictably 
5 See 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§22.5-22.7. 
6 Section 34A defines the "personal injury protection" that is the subject of 
Section 34M. 
7 Amending G.L., c. 175, §113B. 
8 Adding §34 0 to G.L., c. 90. 
9 H.R. No. 3172 (1972). 
10 Federal motor vehicle safety standards are set by the Secretary of Trans-
portation under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 
U.S.C. §1381 et. seq.). 
25
Wadsworth: Chapter 5: Insurance Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
118 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §5.17 
experience some difficulty in establishing classifications of "less damage-
able motor vehicles" that will be acceptable to both the insurance in-
dustry and consumers. 
Finally, two other amendments relating to motor vehicle liability in-
surance should be briefly noted. Under Chapter 366 of the Acts of 1972,11 
premium charges for motor vehicle liability policies and bonds that are 
in effect for less than a full calendar year must be prorated according 
to the actual calendar days of coverage, unless the policy is cancelled by 
the insured. Finally, Chapter 299 of the Acts of 197212 prohibits insurers 
from requiring a medical examination of any applicant for motor ve-
hicle liability insurance. 
§5.17. Miscellaneous Acts. Individual accident and health insurance 
policies commonly include provisions that preclude recovery if an injury 
or sickness for which recovery is sought is the result of a condition that 
existed at the time the policy was issued. Chapter 714 of the Acts of 19721 
potentially restricts the use of such provisions by requiring an insurer 
that denies liability under such a provision to accompany its letter of 
denial with "documented evidence of specific instances of actual treat-
ment or observation of such pre-existing condition, illness or injury." 
The minimum qualifications for applicants for insurance agent and 
broker licenses are enumerated in G.L., c. 175.2 Chapter 162 of the Acts 
of 19723 now provides an exemption from those requirements for appli-
cants who have received the designations of "Chartered Property and 
Casualty Underwriter" or "Chartered Life Underwriter" on the condi-
tion that they complete a certain number of hours of a "course of study, 
approved as to method and content by the Commissioner." 
Chapter 421 of the Acts of 1972 affects various relatively minor amend-
ments to the statutory scheme that regulates the sale of life insurance 
by Massachusetts savings banks.4o The regulation and administration of 
Massachusetts savings bank life insurance is carried on principally by 
the Division of Savings Bank Life Insurance and the trustees of the 
General Insurance Guaranty Fund. The most significant aspects of Chap-
ter 421 deal with the qualifications necessary for appointment as trustee 
of the Fund5 and with the means whereby the cost of operating the Di-
vision is borne by the various banks writing life insurance.6 
11 Amending G.L., c. 175, 1113B. 
12 Adding § 113N to G.L., c. 175. 
§5.17. 1 Adding §108(2) (a) (2A) to G.L., c. 175. 
2 See G.L., c. 175, §§163. 163A (relating to agents); G.L., c. 175 §§166, 166A 
(relating to brokers). 
3 Acts of 1972, c. 162, §§1 (amending G.L., c. 175, §163A), 2 (amending G.L., 
c. 175, §166A). 
+ Such regulation is pursuant to G.L., cc. 26, 178. 
5 Acts of 1972, c. 421, §l, amending G.L., c. 26, §9, specifies that the Com-
missioner of Savings Bank Life Insurance, who is also a trustee of the Fund, 
shall not be a salaried officer of any bank writing life insurance. Section 2 of 
Chapter 421, amending G.L., c. 26, §to, provides that after July 1, 1976, two 
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During the 1972 SURVEY year, the customary changes and additions 
to the chapters of the General Laws relating to pension and group in-
surance coverage of public employees were promulgated.' Suffice it to 
say that the changes made, relatively minor for the most part, continue 
the liberalizing trend in benefits observed in recent years. 
of the seven trustees of the Fund must be full-time sal'aried officers of banks 
writing life insurance. Section 2 also provides that no trustee may be affiliated 
with an ordinary life insurance company. 
6 Acts of 1972, c. 421, §6, amending G.L., c. 178, 117. 
, G.L., c. 32, relating to retirement systems and pensions for public employees, 
was amended by Acts of 1972, cc. 284, 343, 793, and 809; G.L., c. 32A, which 
deals with group insurance coverage for "Persons in the Service of the Common-
wealth," was amended by Acts of 1972, c. 686; G.L., c. 32B, concerning "Persons 
in the Service of Counties, Cities, Towns and Districts, and their Dependents," 
was amended by Acts of 1972, cc. 641 and 763. 
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